Luis Mekenzi, bivši komandant mirovnih snaga u BIH

LUIS MEKENZI, BIVŠI KOMANDANT MIROVNIH SNAGA U BIH

SREBRENICA I SRPSKA GROBNICA

• Kanadski general podsetio je da su Muslimani pod komandom Nasera Orića ubili nekoliko hiljada srpskih civila

Kanadski general Luis Mekenzi, prvi komandant mirovnih snaga u Bosni (Unprofor), u autorskom testu za kanadski list „Gloub end mejl“ ocenio je „da u Srebrenici 1995. godine nije pobijeno 8.000 Muslimana i da je istina o tragičnim događajima u toj enklavi drugačija od one koju poslednjih dana prikazuju pojedini mediji“.
– Evidencija dostavljena Haškom tribunalu izaziva ozbiljnu sumnju u tvrdnju da je više od 8.000 bosanskih Muslimana masakrirano u Srebrenici. U taj broj uračunato je i 5.000 onih koji su se vodili kao nestali. Takođe, više od 2.000 tela pronađeno je u i oko Srebrenice i među njima su i žrtve trogodišnjih borbi u toj oblasti. Matematika jednostavno ne podržava broj od 8.000 ubijenih – ističe kanadski general.
– Bio sam tamo, znam šta se dešavalo i želeo sam da pokažem da slika nije crno-bela, da loši nisu odjednom došli i poubijali dobre. Situacija je mnogo kompleksnija – napisao je Mekenzi uz podsećanje da su muslimanske snage pod komandom Nasera Orića ubile nekoliko hiljada srpskih civila.

Orić ubijao, pa pobegao

– Uz pomoć sa strane Muslimani su uspeli da u oblast Srebenice ubace na hiljade boraca i dosta oružja. Kako su postajali bolje opremljeni i obučeni, počeli su da napadaju van Srebrenice, pale srpska sela i ubijaju njihove stanovnike, a onda bi se hitro povlačili u bezbednu oblast pod okriljem UN. Napadi su dostigli kulminaciju 1994. godine i nastavili su se u 1995. kada su kanadske snage zamenjene sa holandskim. Kada se 1995. godine sneg otopio, Naseru Oriću, koji je vodio muslimanske borce, postalo je jasno da će srpske snage napasti Srebrenicu kako bi ga sprečile da i dalje napada srpska sela. Zbog toga on sa velikim brojem svojih vojnika beži iz grada. Srebrenica je ostala nebranjena s uverenjem da će ako Srbi napadnu nebranjeni grad, NATO i UN napasti Srbe – napisao je Mekenzi.

– Naser Orić, muslimanski vojni lider iz Srerenice, trenutno je u Hagu na suđenju za ratne zločine koje je izvršio „braneći grad“. Dokazi potvrđuju da je on odgovoran za smrt isto onoliko srpskih civila iz okoline Srebrenice koliko je vojska bosanskih Srba ubila u Srebrenici – napisao je Mekenzi.
– Svestan sam da će me možda optužiti da ovim tekstom stajem na srpsku stranu, ali ljudi moraju da shvate da istina nije jednostavna. LJudi greše, jer žele da stvari uproste i ne žele da prihvate da u Srebrenici nije bilo crnih i belih nego da su svi bili manje-više krivi. Ja nemam nikakvih problema da optužim (Ratka) Mladića za zlodela, ali isto tako tražim i da oni koji su ubijali Srbe budu kažnjeni – zaključio je Mekenzi.
Bivši komandant trupa UN u BiH podseća da je u martu 1993. godine njegov naslednik na čelu Unprofora, francuski general Filip Morion, protivno savetima šefova iz UN, došao u Srebrenicu sa malim kontingentom kanadskih vojnika i rekao stanovnicima da će ih UN štititi.
– NJegovi šefovi u UN u NJujorku bili su besni zbog tog obećanja, ali pošto su mediji bili na strani Moriona, odlučili su da uvedu koncept zaštićenih zona za šest oblasti u Bosni, uključujući i Srebrenicu – piše Mekenzi.

Nije bilo genocida

– Muslimanski muškarci i stariji dečaci su odvojeni, a starci, žene i deca su prebacivani u pravcu Tuzle na bezbedno. To je strašno, ali isto tako treba reći da ako neko želi da izvrši genocid, on neće dozvoliti ženama da odu, jer su one ključne za održanje jedne grupe koju pokušavate da eliminišete. Mnogi muškarci i dečaci su ubijeni i sahranjeni u masovne grobnice. Zbirom dva loša nikada se ne dobija dobro, ali oni momenti iz istorije zbog kojih nas je sramota zbog nečinjenja da se ona spreče ne mogu da se gledaju izolovano bez konteksta koji su do njih doveli – objasnio je kanadski general.

– Kada su me pitali koliko vojnika je potrebno da bi se zaštitila oblast rekao sam 135.000 računajući da Srbi imaju snažnu artiljeriju, dok je novi komandant UN u Bosni, belgijski general Fransis Brikemon kazao je da je spreman da oblast brani sa 65.000 vojnika. Tadašnji generalni sekretar UN-a Butros Butros Gali preporučio je Savetu bezbednosti da UN pošalju 27.500 vojnika, a Savet bezbednosti je prihvatio 12.000. Šest meseci kasnije manje od 2.000 vojnika Unprofora dobilo je zadatak da brani Srebrenicu – zaključio je kanadski general.

The Globe and Mail (Canada), July 14, 2005
The real story behind Srebrenica

By LEWIS MacKENZIE

This week marked the 10th anniversary of the United Nations’ second greatest failure since its creation in 1945 — the genocide in Rwanda being the undisputed No. 1. With much fanfare, the ceremonies focused on the massacre of „up to“ 8,000 Bosnian men and boys by General Ratko Mladic’s Bosnian Serb army in Srebrenica in July of 1995.

In the vast majority of recent media reports, the background and responsibilities for the disaster in Srebrenica were absent. Preferred was the simple explanation: a black and white event in which the Serbs were solely to blame.

As someone who played a modest role in some of the events preceding the massacre, perhaps a little background will provide some context. In early 1993, after my release from the Canadian Forces, I was asked to appear before a number of U.S. congressional committees dealing with Bosnia. A few months earlier, my successor in the UN Protection Force, General Philippe Morillon, had –against the advice of his UN masters — bullied his way into Srebrenica accompanied by a tiny contingent of Canadian soldiers and told its citizens they were now under the protection of the UN. The folks at the UN in New York were furious with Gen. Morillon but, with the media on his side, they were forced to introduce the „safe haven“ concept for six areas of Bosnia, including Srebrenica.

Wondering what this concept would mean, one U.S. senator asked me how many troops it would take to defend the safe havens. „Somewhere in the neighbourhood of 135,000 troops,“ I replied. It had to be that large because of the Serb artillery’s range. The new UN commander on the ground in Bosnia, Belgian General Francis Briquemont, said he agreed with my assessment but was prepared to try to defend the areas with 65,000 additional troops. The secretary-general of the day, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, went to the Security Council and recommended 27,500 additional troops. The Security Council approved a force of 12,000 and, six months later, fewer than 2,000 additional soldiers had been added to UNPROFOR for the safe-haven tasks.

Then the Security Council changed the wording of the safe-haven resolution from „the UN will defend the safe havens“ to „by their presence will the UN deter attacks on the safe havens.“ In other words, a tiny, token, lightly armed UN contingent would be placed as sacrificial lambs in Srebrenica to „deter“ the Bosnian Serb army.

It didn’t take long for the Bosnian Muslims to realize that the UN was in no position to live up to its promise to „protect“ Srebrenica. With some help from outsiders, they began to infiltrate thousands of fighters and weapons into the safe haven. As the Bosnian Muslim fighters became better equipped and trained, they started to venture outside Srebrenica, burning Serb villages and killing their occupants before quickly withdrawing to the security provided by the UN’s safe haven. These attacks reached a crescendo in 1994 and carried on into early 1995 after the Canadian infantry company that had been there for a year was replaced by a larger Dutch contingent.

The Bosnian Serbs might have had the heaviest weapons, but the Bosnian Muslims matched them in infantry skills that were much in demand in the rugged terrain around Srebrenica. As the snow cleared in the spring of 1995, it became obvious to Nasar Oric, the man who led the Bosnian Muslim fighters, that the Bosnian Serb army was going to attack Srebrenica to stop him from attacking Serb villages. So he and a large number of his fighters slipped out of town. Srebrenica was left undefended with the strategic thought that, if the Serbs attacked an undefended town, surely that would cause NATO and the UN to agree that NATO air strikes against the Serbs were justified. And so the Bosnian Serb army strolled into Srebrenica without opposition.

What happened next is only debatable in scale. The Bosnian Muslim men and older boys were singled out and the elderly, women and children were moved out or pushed in the direction of Tuzla and safety. It’s a distasteful point, but it has to be said that, if you’re committing genocide, you don’t let the women go since they are key to perpetuating the very group you are trying to eliminate. Many of the men and boys were executed and buried in mass graves.

Evidence given at The Hague war crimes tribunal casts serious doubt on the figure of „up to“ 8,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred. That figure includes „up to“ 5,000 who have been classified as missing. More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn’t support the scale of 8,000 killed.

Nasar Oric, the Bosnian Muslim military leader in Srebrenica, is currently on trial in The Hague for war crimes committed during his „defence“ of the town. Evidence to date suggests that he was responsible for killing as many Serb civilians outside Srebrenica as the Bosnian Serb army was for massacring Bosnian Muslims inside the town.

Two wrongs never made a right, but those moments in history that shame us all because of our indifference should not be viewed in isolation without the context that created them.

Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/jul05/hed7098.shtml